Speaker: Professor Tang Qianfeng (School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)
Moderator: Assistant Professor Yu Li (Li Anmin Institute of Economic Research, Liaoning University)
Guest: Assistant Professor He Zhenyu (Li Anmin Institute of Economic Research, Liaoning University)
Time: October 12, 2026 (Monday) 10:30–12:00 (Beijing Time)
Venue: Meeting Room 483, Economics Division Building, Puhe Campus, Liaoning University
Language: Chinese/English
Abstract:
We study surplus division in network-constrained bilateral matching markets with transferable utility. We introduce a new solution concept—the credible bargaining solution—which refines stability by requiring that, for each matched pair of buyer and seller, surplus be divided according to the Nash bargaining solution with respect to credible outside options, defined as their payoffs in some stable outcome of the submarket obtained by removing their link. We establish general properties of the credible bargaining solution, prove existence, and provide a complete characterization in the unit-surplus case based on the notion of essential links.
Author Profile:
Tang Qianfeng is a tenured professor and doctoral supervisor at the School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. His main research areas include microeconomic theory, game theory, and market mechanism design. His research findings have been published in top international journals such as the Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, and Economic Theory. He has led Youth Projects and General Projects funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China, and has participated in key research programs. In recent years, he has made systematic progress in areas such as stable matching mechanisms and the theoretical relationship between priority ranking and welfare efficiency. In terms of teaching, he offers graduate courses such as Advanced Microeconomics, and is committed to integrating theoretical research with mechanism design practice, training a new generation of scholars in the fields of mechanism design and matching theory.
