主讲人：凤迪 助理教授（东北财经大学金融系）

主持人：谢明佳 助理教授（辽宁大学李安民经济研究院）

嘉宾介绍：何真瑜 助理教授（辽宁大学李安民经济研究院）

时间：2024年9月27日（周五） 10:00 – 11:30（北京时间）

地点：辽宁大学崇山校区五洲园一楼会议室

线上地址：腾讯会议358-6417-4104

语言：中文/英文

摘要： We consider an extension of Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) and house allocation problems (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979) to object allocation problems with coalitional endowments (housing markets with existing tenants are an example). For this relatively new class of problems, we consider natural extensions of properties that have been considered for these classical benchmark models as well as a new property: coalitional endowment lower bound (extending individual rationality), group strategy-proofness (applicable without change), coalitional endowments neutrality (extending neutrality), and the new property of preferences swapping reallocation proofness. Our main result is the characterization of a new class of mechanisms by the above properties, the class of sequential priorities-augmented top trading cycles mechanisms.

主讲人简介：

Di Feng is an Assistant Professor in the Finance Department at Dongbei University of Finance and Economics. Prior to it, he earned his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Lausanne (HEC Lausanne), and served as a Postdoctoral Fellow at Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute (formerly known as the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute) in Berkeley. He also holds the position of a Junior Research Fellow at Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University. He uses tools from game theory, operations research, psychology, and computer science to study how different markets / mechanisms affect the incentives and motivations of participants, and the corresponding economic outcomes.